Inclusion of Pwamang, Asiedu in Committee violates right to fair hearing -CJ argues in substantive submission in the Supreme Court

In a legal move being described as one of the most consequential constitutional cases in Ghana’s recent history, the Chief Justice of the Republic has filed an action at the Supreme Court challenging the legality of proceedings initiated for her removal from office by President John Mahama.

The Chief Justice, who is the head of the Judiciary—the only constitutionally independent arm of government—is seeking redress over what she characterizes as a series of egregious constitutional violations, which she argues undermine the very principle of judicial independence.

According to the facts laid out in her statement of case, the Chief Justice was first made aware of the removal petitions not through formal notification, but via a presidential press release issued on March 25, 2025, and disseminated widely by the media. The press statement disclosed that the President had received three petitions seeking her removal and had commenced consultations with the Council of State under Article 146 of the Constitution.

The Chief Justice contends that she was neither notified of the petitions nor given an opportunity to respond prior to the initiation of such grave constitutional steps. She formally requested copies of the petitions on March 27, which were provided two days later. In her responses, she contested their merit on legal and factual grounds.

However, despite a pending suit by Member of Parliament Vincent Ekow Assafuah, who had sought the intervention of the Supreme Court to halt the process, the President went ahead to declare a prima facie case had been established against the Chief Justice on April 22. That same day, the Chief Justice was formally informed by letter that a five-member investigative committee had been constituted and that she was suspended pending the inquiry.

The Chief Justice has raised serious concerns over the legality and impartiality of the committee’s composition. She points out that two members, Justices Gabriel Pwamang and Samuel Adibu-Asiedu, had previously adjudicated on related matters involving the petitioners or the constitutional questions now before the Court—circumstances she says disqualify them due to the constitutional requirement of impartiality.

Moreover, she notes that several members of the committee had not taken the required oath under Article 156(1) of the Constitution before commencing their work, rendering any proceedings held prior to the oath-taking constitutionally void.

She further criticises the lack of transparency in the President’s prima facie determination, which she describes as “arbitrary” and “devoid of judicial reasoning.” The surrounding circumstances—including media leaks, a government-aligned opinion poll calling for her removal, and the general tenor of public discourse—indicate to her a politically motivated effort to remove the head of the Judiciary, a move she argues threatens the constitutional balance of power.

The Chief Justice is invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the Constitution, citing violations of due process and judicial independence. Her legal team references landmark cases such as Agyei-Twum v. Attorney-General, Justice Dery v. Tiger Eye P.I., and Ghana Bar Association v. Attorney-General, to support their position that constitutional safeguards for the Judiciary are under siege.

Her case, described as “not merely a procedural objection but a constitutional defence of the independence of the Judiciary,” urges the Supreme Court to see beyond personalities and temporary politics. In a philosophical appeal invoking John Rawls’ “veil of ignorance,” the Chief Justice invites the Court to consider the precedent it sets—not just for this case, but for all future occupants of the bench.

“This moment,” the statement says, “presents a rare and critical opportunity for the Supreme Court to reaffirm Ghana’s commitment to judicial independence and constitutional governance.”

With the sesquicentennial of the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1876 approaching, many legal scholars see this case as a defining moment in Ghana’s constitutional history—one that could either reaffirm or redefine the boundaries of executive power over the Judiciary.

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GHANA
ACCRA- A.D. 2025
Suit No.: J1/22/2025
Between

HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE GERTRUDE ARABA ESAABA SACKEY TORKORNOO Chief Justice’s Residence,
Cantonments,
Accra. Plaintiff

And

1. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
   Office of the Attorney-General and Ministry of Justice,
   Accra
2. JUSTICE GABRIEL SCOTT PWAMANG
3. JUSTICE SAMUEL KWAME ADIBU-ASIEDU
4. DANIEL YAO DOMELOVO
5. MAJOR FLORA BAZWAANURA DALUGO
6. PROFESSOR JAMES SEFAH DZISAH Defendants

STATEMENT OF PLAINTIFF’S CASE
Pursuant to leave of Court granted on 26th June, 2025

INTRODUCTION

This action has been commenced by the Chief Justice of the Republic, who is the Head of the Judiciary—the third arm of the State and indeed the only independent branch of government, which is not and should never be subject to external control. The Chief Justice seeks redress against multiple constitutional violations inherent in the proceedings initiated for her removal from office. At stake in this action is not mere procedural regularity but the vital preservation and protection of judicial independence, a principle jealously safeguarded throughout the nation’s constitutional history and prior compositions of the Supreme Court, and which this current Supreme Court is uniquely and timeously positioned to protect for the future of itself and Ghana’s infant democracy.

Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to defend the Judiciary from undue external control, with the earnest hope that this Supreme Court will recognise and appreciate the significance of this critical moment in the history of the nation and the Supreme Court itself, even as it approaches the sesquicentennial of the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876.

Furthermore, this litigation presents a rare and critical opportunity for this Honourable Court to advance and clarify significant constitutional doctrines initiated in landmark cases such as Agyei-Twum v. Attorney-General & Anor [2005-2006] SCGLR 732 and Justice Dery v. Tiger Eye P.I. & 2 Others [2015-2016] 2 SCGLR 812, particularly regarding the required standards for prima facie determinations under Article 146, always mindful that as Ghana’s highest court, it is setting a precedent for how current and future Justices of the Court could be treated and signalling to the Executive the extent of likely judicial pushback in future efforts to remove Justices of the Superior Courts.

Jurisprudentially, this moment invites the Honourable Justices of this Court go behind what the famous legal philosopher, John Rawls, called the “Veil of Ignorance” – a veil that is to help people envision a just society by temporarily forgetting their own personal circumstances. John Rawls invites you to imagine that you are creating rules for Ghana and future Justices of this Honourable Court from behind a veil that conceals your identity, status, aspirations and other circumstances of your life. John Rawl’s “Veil of Ignorance”, which is intended to promote impartiality and fairness in decision-making is more important to this Honourable Court than it has ever been. As John Rawls note in his book – A Theory of Justice, “the principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance”.

As observed by Wiredu JSC (as he then was) in his concurring opinion in the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court, fending off an attempt to remove the Chief Justice of Ghana through the back door, in Ghana Bar Association v. Attorney-General & Anor [1995-96] 1 SCGLR 598, the history of the development of constitutional law in Ghana shows that on some occasions, Chief Justices “have not been spared the ordeal of having to be engaged in court proceedings either to defend their positions or in having to answer allegations of acts done in contravention of the provisions of the Constitution. In all such cases, the Supreme Court has boldly … determined each case confidently and has courageously proved equal to the challenge posed by those cases …”

The resolution of this action will have profound, far-reaching historical implications not only for the Judiciary but also for other constitutional and statutory bodies whose terms and conditions of service are intricately tied to Article 146. It thus represents a pivotal moment for constitutional jurisprudence and the safeguarding of institutional independence.

This Statement of Case is presented in the following order:

A. Facts of case
B. Original jurisdiction of this Honourable Court
C. The proper and applicable principles of interpretation
D. Arguments in support of the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff
E. Conclusion
F. List of authorities

For clarity, some of the topics listed above may have subheadings.

A. FACTS OF CASE

1. On Tuesday, the 25th of March, 2025, the Plaintiff, in her capacity as Chief Justice of the Republic of Ghana, was taken by complete surprise upon learning—through various media outlets—that the Spokesperson to the President had issued an official press statement titled “President Mahama Consults with the Council of State on three (3) Petitions for the removal of the Chief Justice.” This was the first time the Plaintiff became aware of any suggestion that petitions had been submitted to the President seeking her removal from office. Until that point, she had received no formal communication from any constitutional authority or person in respect of any such petitions.
2. Upon obtaining and reviewing a copy of the said press statement from publicly available sources, the Plaintiff noted, with considerable concern, that the Spokesperson had publicly stated that the President had received three separate petitions seeking her removal from office as Chief Justice and had, pursuant to Article 146 of the Constitution, forwarded them to the Council of State for the commencement of the constitutionally prescribed consultative process.
3. With the utmost respect, the Plaintiff found this deeply troubling, as it demonstrated a blatant disregard for established constitutional principles of due process and judicial independence. The initiation of such consequential constitutional processes without affording the Chief Justice—the subject of the petitions—an opportunity to be notified of the allegations or to respond constitutes a gross procedural anomaly and a fundamental breach of her rights.
4. Consequently, on 27th March 2025, the Plaintiff formally wrote to the President requesting copies of the petitions upon which the consultation with the Council of State had been initiated. By a letter dated 29th March 2025, the President acceded to her request and provided the said petitions. The Plaintiff subsequently submitted comprehensive responses to each of the three petitions, setting out legal and factual grounds upon which she contended that the petitions were devoid of merit.
5. Around this same period, a Ghanaian citizen and Member of Parliament for the Tafo Constituency in the Ashanti Region, Hon. Vincent Ekow Assafuah, alarmed by the unconstitutionality of the developing circumstances, invoked the original jurisdiction of this Honourable Court seeking declaratory reliefs. He also filed an interlocutory application to restrain the President and the Council of State from proceeding with the consultation process under Article 146 until the substantive matter was adjudicated.
6. Notwithstanding the pendency of this application—with which the Attorney-General had been duly served and had responded to—and despite the fact that the matter had been adjourned on two occasions by this Honourable Court, the President, on 22nd April 2025, issued a press release announcing that a prima facie case had been established in respect of the petitions. This development was again conveyed through the media before any direct formal notification was made to the Plaintiff.
7. Later that same day, the Plaintiff received a letter from the Office of the President, signed by the Secretary to the President, which formally informed her that a prima facie case had been established against her. The letter further stated that a five-member committee had been constituted under Article 146(6) to inquire into the petitions, and that, by a warrant issued under Article 146(10), she had been suspended from her office as Chief Justice pending the outcome of the committee’s proceedings.
8. It is pertinent to note that prior to the issuance of the warrant of suspension, a purported opinion poll—organised by a pollster known to be closely aligned with the Government—was circulated to the public, alleging that the Plaintiff was unpopular and ought to be removed from office. This lends further credence to the view that the process was not initiated in good faith and raises serious concerns about the political motivation behind the proceedings.
9. In addition, there have been multiple unauthorised leaks to the media of documents purported to be the petitions and the Plaintiff’s responses thereto. These leaks, coupled with the pervasive media commentary and reporting across radio, television, and print outlets, have caused significant prejudice to the Plaintiff and the integrity of the entire process. Given these circumstances, in camera proceedings, as contemplated under Article 146(8), would serve no useful purpose. On the contrary, the demands of justice, fairness, and public confidence would be best served by a public hearing of the petitions, particularly where no threat is posed to public morality, public safety, or public order.
10. Furthermore, the President’s purported prima facie determination, as communicated in the letter dated 22nd April 2025, contained no reasons or justification and was entirely devoid of the elements of judicial or quasi-judicial reasoning expected under the Constitution. It failed to meet the standard of a judicious and objective assessment and, as such, is arbitrary, capricious, and constitutionally infirm.
11. Compounding the illegality is the composition of the committee itself. Justice Gabriel Scott Pwamang, who was named as the Chairperson, is disqualified from serving on the committee, having previously adjudicated on cases affecting two of the petitioners, Mr. Daniel Ofori and Ayamga Akulgo, in the Supreme Court, and those matters were the subject of some of the allegations in two of the petitions against plaintiff. Justice Gabriel Pwamang had in fact rendered decisions in a case involving Daniel Ofori as part of a panel of which the Plaintiff was also a member. Similarly, Justice Samuel Kwame Adibu-Asiedu had earlier sat on a panel of the Supreme Court that heard an application in a suit challenging the very proceedings now being pursued under Article 146. His participation undermines the principle of judicial impartiality and independence.
12. Moreover, the remaining members of the committee had not taken the requisite oath under Article 156(1) of the Constitution and the Oaths Act, 1972 (NRCD 6), as at the time the committee first convened on 15th May 2025, rendering their participation in any proceedings prior to taking the prescribed oath unconstitutional and unlawful.

B. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT

13. Before turning to the substantive merits of our case, we respectfully seek to address this Honourable Court on the preliminary issue of jurisdiction. This approach accords with established judicial practice and principles, exemplified notably in the decision of this Honourable Court in Attorney-General (No. 2) v. Tsatsu Tsikata (No. 2) [2001-2002] SCGLR 620, wherein Acquah JSC (as he then was) stated as follows:

“It is therefore trite knowledge that the duty of every judge in any proceedings is to satisfy himself that he has jurisdiction in the matter before him.”

14. The original jurisdiction of this Honourable Court emanates from the Constitution. The explicit terms of Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the Constitution ground this Court’s jurisdiction to entertain actions by which a person either seeks interpretation of the Constitution or an enforcement of same.
15. For the avoidance of doubt, Article 2(1) of the Constitution provides as follows:

“2. Enforcement of the Constitution
(1) A person who alleges that
(a) An enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other enactment, or
(b) Any act or omission of any person,
is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.”

16. Article 130(1) further provides that:

“130. Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
(1) Subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court in the enforcement of the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms as provided in article 33 of this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in
(a) all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of this Constitution; and
(b) all matters arising as to whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers conferred on Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this Constitution.”

17. For more than fifty (50) years, the jurisprudence of this Honourable Court has consistently defined circumstances under which a question of constitutional interpretation may properly arise. Notably, in the seminal decision of Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Akosah [1980] GLR 592, the Court of Appeal, then sitting as the Supreme Court, carefully considered the circumstances under which an issue of interpretation or enforcement arises within the contemplation of Article 118(1)(a) of the 1979 Constitution, which provides as follows:

“118. (1) The Supreme Court shall, except as otherwise provided in article 35 of this Constitution, have original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts,
(a) in all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of any provision of this Constitution; and
(b) where a question arises whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers conferred upon Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this Constitution.”

18. Anin JA, delivering the judgment of the Court after reviewing previous decisions of the Court, summarised the position at page 605 thus:

“Summary of the Case Law on Enforcement or Interpretation
From the foregoing dicta, we would conclude that an issue of enforcement or interpretation of a provision of the Constitution under article 118(1)(a) arises in any of the following eventualities:
(a) where the words of the provision are imprecise or unclear or ambiguous. Put in another way, it arises if one party invites the court to declare that the words of the article have a double-meaning or are obscure or otherwise mean something different from or more than what they say;
(b) where rival meanings have been placed by the litigants on the words of any provision of the Constitution;
(c) where there is a conflict in the meaning and effect of two or more articles of the Constitution, and the question is raised as to which provision shall prevail;
(d) where on the face of the provisions, there is a conflict between the operation of particular institutions set up under the Constitution, and thereby raising problems of enforcement and of interpretation.
On the other hand, there is no case of “enforcement or interpretation” where the language of the article of the Constitution is clear, precise and unambiguous…he should certainly not invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under article 118.”

19. The test set out in Ex parte Akosah (supra) has been applied with approval by the Supreme Court in the Fourth Republic in relation to its original interpretative and enforcement jurisdiction under articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the Constitution in cases such as Republic v Special Tribunal; ex parte Forson [1980] GLR 529, Republic v High Court (Fast Track Division) Accra; ex parte Electoral Commission (Mettle-Nunoo & Others Interested Parties) [2005-2006] SCGLR 514, Republic v Edusei (No. 2) v Attorney General [1998-99] SCGLR 753; and Republic v Court of Appeal, Accra; ex parte Tsatsu Tsikata [2005-2006] SCGLR 612.
20. The Court has adopted the same approach in recent decisions in Justice Abdulai v. The Attorney-General – Suit no. J1/07/2022 (Unreported – Judgment delivered on 6 March 2022); Michael Ankomah Nimfa v. James Gyakye Quayson – Suit No. J1/11/2022 (Unreported – Judgment delivered on 17 May 2023); and Alexander Afenyo Markin vrs. 1. Speaker of Parliament 2. Attorney-General – Suit No. J1/01/2025 (Unreported – Judgment delivered on 12 November 2024).
21. In this case, it is respectfully submitted that a genuine and substantial issue of constitutional interpretation arises upon a careful examination of the relevant constitutional provisions. It must be emphasised that there is no doubt that the language employed in Article 146, particularly clauses (6) and (7), is sketchy and capable of multiple competing interpretations. In their literal and plain construction, clauses (6) and (7) of Article 146 merely mandate the President, in consultation with the Council of State, to establish a committee, as outlined therein, to investigate petitions seeking the removal of the Chief Justice upon receipt of such petitions. However, the jurisprudence of this Honourable Court, specifically in Agyei-Twum v. Attorney-General & Akwettey [2005-2006] SCGLR 732, demonstrates that a purely literal interpretation of Article 146(6) and (7) may significantly undermine and jeopardise the rights of the Chief Justice, who is the subject of the contemplated removal proceedings. In furtherance of the principles of judicial independence and security of tenure of judges, the Court interpreted article 146(6) and (7) to give the Chief Justice greater protection, by requiring that before the establishment of a committee to inquire into a petition against the Chief Justice for his removal, the President in consultation with the Council of State, makes a prima facie determination of the merits of the petition in question.
22. It is however, respectfully submitted that the previous interpretations rendered by this Honourable Court in respect of Article 146(3), (4), (6) and (7) did not directly address the critical question of whether the determination of a prima facie case in relation to a petition for the removal of the Chief Justice necessitates the extension of the constitutional right to be heard to the Chief Justice. Nor did the Court, in its previous pronouncements, examine the standard to be applied in making a prima facie determination.
23. In light of the fact that a prima facie determination under article 146(3), (4), (6) and (7) is a quasi-judicial process, in our submission, such a determination must at the barest minimum, (i) specify which of the charges in the petition(s) have met the yardstick of a prima facie case (ii) be accompanied by clearly stated reasons, reflecting a judicious evaluation of the matters raised. As we would demonstrate below, the need for such judicious evaluation is compelled by the very nature of allegations that may form the subject matter of an article 146 proceeding. The absence of such reasoning fundamentally undermines the fairness and transparency required by the Constitution.
24. For the avoidance of doubt, it cannot be contended that the determination of a prima facie case and effecting of a suspension of the Chief Justice, which affects her rights to exercise authority as the Head of Ghana’s Judiciary, is an act immune from this Honourable Court’s scrutiny under articles 2 and 130(1) of the Constitution. No organ, arm or authority of state purporting to exercise a power under the Constitution, 1992 can clothe itself with immunity to an action invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under article 2(1) of the Constitution.
25. Furthermore, it is submitted that there is a real issue regarding whether the constitutional stipulation in article 146(8) for proceedings to be in camera implies that the subject of an article 146 proceeding cannot waive his right to an in camera hearing or excludes the subject’s right to apply for the proceedings to be in public. This Honourable Court has previously had occasion to examine the constitutional requirement for confidentiality in proceedings for the removal from office of constitutional and statutory office holders under Article 146(8), notably in Dery v. Tiger Eye P.I. (supra). Notwithstanding the Court’s guidance, the constitutional injunction requiring in camera proceedings continues to be disregarded with impunity, with little or no means of monitoring or remedying such violations. Where, however, the person against whom such proceedings are initiated elects to waive the right to confidentiality, particularly in circumstances where details of the proceedings have already been widely publicised and discussed at length in the public domain, it is submitted that such a waiver should be respected in the interest of transparency, fairness, and the public good.
26. The Plaintiff respectfully contends that, having regard to the overarching constitutional principle of judicial independence, there exists a compelling need to safeguard the office of the Chief Justice from the risk of arbitrary, frivolous, or vexatious petitions initiated by an overzealous Executive or any misguided individual or authority seeking, through such processes, to exert improper influence over the Judiciary. The use of the petition mechanism under Article 146 to suspend or remove the Chief Justice, who serves as the head of the only independent arm of government, must not become a convenient tool for executive interference with the Judiciary or institutional destabilisation. The Court thus owes a duty to critically scrutinise actions taken by the President purportedly under article 146(10) of the Constitution.
27. As a corollary, the Court is duty bound to give a listening ear to complaints of executive encroachment on judicial autonomy and attempts to interfere with the independence of the Judiciary through article 146 proceedings, rather than affirming executive authority through a swift disposal of such challenges.
28. It is submitted that the constitutional right to be heard must be accorded to the Chief Justice both prior to and during the process for determining whether a prima facie case has been established. Furthermore, there should be a reasoned decision at the conclusion of a prima facie determination. Such procedural safeguards are necessitated by a purposive and harmonious construction of the Constitution’s provisions and underlying values, including Articles 17, 19, 23, 125, 127, 146 and 296 all of which enshrine the ideals of fairness, due process, and judicial autonomy.
29. It is the Plaintiff’s respectful submission that, upon a true and proper interpretation of the Constitution, this Honourable Court will find that the observance of the audi alteram partem rule at the threshold stage of prima facie determination is not merely desirable but constitutionally mandated, particularly in proceedings implicating the tenure and integrity of the Chief Justice.
30. Another basis for the invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction is the composition of the committee to conduct an inquiry into the allegations against the plaintiff under article 146(6) of the Constitution. The thrust of the plaintiff’s reliefs and argument herein, is that, merely because the President has the power to set up a committee in the manner specified under article 146(6) does not mean he cannot appoint any two Justices at all. As would be demonstrated in these submissions, the President is required to be mindful of the rules of natural justice, reasonableness, perception of bias or impropriety as well as the potential effect of the appointment of some specific Justices of the Supreme Court on the supreme concept of judicial independence. These principles are the burden of articles 23, 296, 125 and 127 of the Constitution. Thus, a real issue is raised whether the appointment of Justices Gabriel Pwamang and Asiedu to serve on the panel is constitutionally justifiable.
31. Respectfully, considering the well-established jurisprudence of this Honourable Court developed over the past five decades—portions of which have been referenced herein—it is submitted that the invocation of the original jurisdiction of this Court by the Plaintiff is proper and justified. The Plaintiff in the circumstances, rightly invites the Court to pronounce upon the following weighty and constitutionally significant questions:

a. Whether the Chief Justice who is the subject of proceedings before a committee appointed under Article 146(6) to inquire into a petition for her removal is entitled to a public hearing as part of the right to a fair hearing, or whether the Chief Justice may waive the right to in camera proceedings under Article 146(8) of the Constitution.

b. Whether the determination by the President of a prima facie case in respect of a petition for the removal of the Chief Justice constitutes a quasi-judicial process requiring a judicious evaluation culminating in a reasoned decision;

c. Whether the purported prima facie determination and subsequent suspension of the Chief Justice, as conveyed in the letter dated 22nd April 2025, amount to an arbitrary, capricious and unconstitutional exercise of power, in violation of the right to a fair hearing and the constitutional guarantee of judicial independence.

d. Whether the appointment of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants—Justice Gabriel Scott Pwamang and Justice Samuel Kwame Adibu-Asiedu—as members of the committee constituted by the President to inquire into petitions for the removal of the Chief Justice is unconstitutional, by reason of prior judicial involvement in matters relating to the petition or proceedings connected thereto;

e. Whether the continued participation in the committee proceedings of the two Justices of this Honourable Court violates the principles of natural justice, judicial impartiality, and the constitutional guarantee of judicial independence.

f. Whether the 4th, 5th, and 6th Defendants are constitutionally qualified to perform the functions assigned to them as members of the committee constituted by the President to inquire into the petitions for the removal of the Chief Justice due to their failure to take and subscribe to the judicial oath; and whether, in the circumstances, the said committee—comprising the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Defendants—is lawfully constituted and capable of lawfully carrying out the mandate set forth in Article 146(6) of the Constitution.

32. We respectfully submit these arguments in unwavering fidelity to the Constitution of the Republic, and in the earnest pursuit of preserving and upholding the hallowed principles of judicial independence and the security of tenure accorded to Justices of the Superior Courts.
33. It is respectfully submitted that, as affirmed by this Honourable Court in Tuffour v. Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637, the sole and paramount consideration in a constitutional action is the proper construction and enforcement of the Constitution itself. The Court’s jurisdiction in such matters is strictly confined to giving effect to the dictates of the Constitution.
34. In Adjei Ampofo (No. 1) v. Accra Metropolitan Assembly and Attorney-General (No. 1) [2007-2008] SCGLR 611, this Honourable Court reaffirmed its exclusive original jurisdiction under Article 130 of the Constitution, to interpret all provisions of the Constitution, including those enshrined in Chapter Five concerning fundamental human rights and freedoms. The Court emphasised that the mere fact that a constitutional provision relates to human rights does not derogate from its exclusive interpretative mandate.
35. This position was further underscored in Republic v. High Court (General Jurisdiction), Accra; Ex Parte Dr. Zanetor Rawlings (Ashittey and National Democratic Congress as Interested Parties) [2015-2016] 1 SCGLR 92, where the Supreme Court reiterated its constitutional authority to pronounce definitively on the meaning and scope of all constitutional provisions, irrespective of their subject matter.
36. The same position was reached by the Court recently, in Michael Ankomah Nimfah v. Gyakye Quayson & 2 Others, when speaking through Amegatcher JSC, the Court noted as follows:
    “However, if parties raise rival positions regarding the meaning and application of the text of the Constitution or the words of a constitutional provision are imprecise, unclear, or ambiguous, then the exclusive jurisdiction of this court is properly invoked for the resolution of the proper interpretation to place on the relevant provision under article 130. See the oft-cited decision in Republic v Special Tribunal; Ex Parte Akosah 1980 GLR 592. Again, if there is a breach of the Constitution, the enforcement jurisdiction of this court conferred in article 2 is rightly invoked.”

C. THE PROPER AND APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION

37. The jurisprudence of this Honourable Court has firmly and consistently established that a purely literal construction of the Constitution, divorced from a consideration of related constitutional provisions and the underlying values, principles, and purposes that animate the Constitution as a whole, does not constitute an appropriate or permissible approach to constitutional interpretation. Rather, a purposive, harmonious, and holistic reading of the Constitution is required to give full effect to its spirit, intent, and framework.
38. It is respectfully submitted that any discourse on the purposive interpretation of the Constitution must begin with the locus classicus of Tuffuor v. Attorney-General [1980] GLR, wherein the Court of Appeal, sitting as the Supreme Court, laid the foundational principle for constitutional interpretation in Ghanaian jurisprudence. In his oft-cited dictum at pages 647–648 of the Report, Sowah JSC (as he then was) articulated the interpretive approach that accords with the nature and character of the Constitution, cautioning against rigid or doctrinaire constructions. His Lordship stated as follows:

“The Constitution has its letter of the law. Equally, the Constitution has its spirit… Its language, therefore, must be considered as if it were a living organism capable of growth and development. A broad and liberal spirit is required for its interpretation. It does not admit of a narrow interpretation. A doctrinaire approach to interpretation would not do. We must take account of its principles and bring that consideration to bear, in bringing it into conformity with the needs of the time.”

39. This pronouncement has become a guiding principle in Ghanaian constitutional interpretation, affirming the necessity of construing the Constitution holistically, with due regard to its overarching values, evolving context, and enduring purpose.
40. Georgina Wood CJ, in Brown v. Attorney-General (Audit Service Case) [2010] SCGLR 183, provided the necessary direction on the most preferred approach to interpreting the Constitution of Ghana.

“The purposive and literal approach in proper context is commendable; it is the purely mechanical or literal that pays no heed to the legislative purpose or intent, that has no place in this area of the law … In the proper context, the objective purposive approach would be the preferred approach, if the Constitution must be read as a whole, in terms of both its explicit and implicit language, and read as a living document, with a view to actualising core values and meeting the hopes and aspirations of the people for whom it was crafted. The spirit of the 1992 Constitution, a judicially established aid to interpretation, is embodied not only in the actual texts, under consideration, but also the goals and objectives as captured in the Preamble, the Directive Principles of State Policy, and indeed the entire document.” Enditem

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