Beyond preserving PIAC under the proposed Natural Resource Revenue Management Act, government should consider elevating the Committee’s institutional and legal status to give it greater independence, operational autonomy and financial security.
Currently, PIAC derives its existence, mandate, composition and funding arrangements from the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815), as amended. This makes the Committee’s institutional future closely tied to the continued existence of the legislation.
The proposed repeal and replacement of the Act therefore presents an opportunity to address this structural limitation by giving PIAC a more permanent and clearly defined institutional identity.
A useful consideration is the institutional status of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), which was established as a statutory corporation under the GNPC Act, 1983 (PNDCL 64).
Although GNPC and PIAC perform fundamentally different functions, their respective importance to the governance of Ghana’s petroleum resources underscores the need for strong statutory foundations for institutions operating within the natural resource sector.
GNPC serves as the state’s commercial vehicle for participation in the petroleum industry, while PIAC provides independent citizen-led oversight of the collection, allocation and utilisation of petroleum revenues.Both institutions contribute to ensuring that Ghana derives benefits from its natural resources, albeit through different responsibilities.
It is therefore worth considering whether PIAC should be given a stronger institutional status, comparable in legal recognition and operational autonomy to established statutory institutions such as GNPC, while retaining its distinct citizen-led oversight character.
Under such an arrangement, PIAC could have an independent statutory identity, a clearly protected mandate, an adequately resourced secretariat and guaranteed funding arrangements that are not dependent solely on discretionary government decisions.
The proposed legislation could also provide for the Committee to report directly to Parliament and the President, retain its independent appointment arrangements and have the authority to obtain relevant information from institutions responsible for natural resource revenue management.
Importantly, granting PIAC stronger institutional status should not compromise its independence by placing it under the administrative or operational control of the Ministry of Finance or any institution it is expected to monitor.
Its membership should continue to reflect the participation of professional bodies, civil society organisations, organised labour, academia and other relevant stakeholders. Indeed, if government is prepared to establish a new sovereign wealth fund and strengthen the institutional framework for managing natural resource revenues, it should equally be prepared to strengthen the institution responsible for ensuring public accountability.
There is little justification for creating stronger structures to manage the country’s natural wealth without giving equal attention to the structures that independently monitor those managing it. PIAC should not remain institutionally vulnerable simply because it was originally established as a committee under petroleum revenue legislation.
The proposed Natural Resource Revenue Management Act should therefore consider giving PIAC a more autonomous statutory status, with the capacity to monitor revenues from petroleum, gold, lithium, bauxite and other extractive resources. Such a reform would not only preserve the Committee but also secure its long-term relevance as a central pillar of Ghana’s natural resource governance architecture.
