By Emmanuel Edem Akomea
Ghana’s Fourth Republic is founded on a simple constitutional principle: political power ultimately belongs to the people. Yet, for decades, the exercise of that power within political parties has largely been mediated through relatively narrow delegate systems. That model may now be approaching its end.
On 29 July 2026, the Supreme Court, by a 5–2 majority in Prof. Kwabena Frimpong-Boateng & Ors v. NPP & Ors, held that the use of delegate-based systems for selecting political party candidates is inconsistent with Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution.
The significance of the decision extends far beyond the internal affairs of the New Patriotic Party. At its core, the case raises a fundamental constitutional question:
Who should have the right to determine the candidates through whom political parties seek to exercise state power?
The Court’s answer points decisively toward the ordinary party member.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GATEWAY
Article 55(5) requires the internal organization of political parties to conform to democratic principles.
The Court’s reasoning treats candidate selection as more than an internal administrative exercise. Political parties are the principal vehicles through which citizens compete for executive and legislative office. Consequently, the process by which parties choose their candidates constitutes an important gateway to the exercise of constitutional political power.
A system that gives a relatively small group of delegates the exclusive authority to determine candidates therefore raises a deeper democratic question: CAN A POLITICAL PARTY CLAIM TO BE INTERNALLY DEMOCRATIC WHEN THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF ITS MEMBERS HAVE NO DIRECT VOTE IN CHOOSING THOSE WHO WILL REPRESENT IT?
The judgment effectively answers that question in the negative.
FROM DELEGATE POWER TO MEMBER POWER
For years, Ghana’s major political parties have relied on delegate conferences and electoral colleges at various stages of their candidate-selection processes.
The result has been a striking imbalance.
Political parties may have millions of supporters and members across the country, yet the decisive vote in important primaries has often rested with a much smaller pool of delegates.
The constitutional significance of the Court’s decision lies in its rejection of that concentration of political choice.
The emerging principle is straightforward: ONE PARTY MEMBER. ONE VOTE.
If implemented fully, this would transform the internal democratic architecture of Ghana’s political parties. Ordinary members would no longer merely provide the numerical strength, campaign labour and financial support upon which parties depend. They would have a direct constitutional role in determining the candidates who seek public office under the party’s banner.
THE ECONOMICS OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE
There is also an important economic dimension to the judgment.
A small electorate creates a concentrated political marketplace. When only a limited number of delegates determine the outcome of a primary, individual votes become comparatively expensive and easier to target.
Money, gifts, personal relationships and localized influence can therefore acquire disproportionate significance.
Expanding the electorate to a much larger body of party members changes that calculation.
It does not eliminate money from politics. Nor does it guarantee that internal elections will automatically become clean or corruption-free. But it potentially makes the targeted purchase of political influence more difficult by increasing the number of people whose votes must be persuaded.
The constitutional reform, therefore, may have consequences not only for political inclusion, but also for the political economy of party primaries.
THE 365-DAY CLOCK
The Court’s decision does not appear designed to produce institutional chaos overnight.
Instead, the Court provided a transition period of 365 days, giving political parties time to bring their internal structures into conformity with the constitutional standard.
That period is more than an administrative grace period.
It is a countdown.
Political parties must confront questions that previously could be deferred:
- Who exactly qualifies as a party member?
- How will membership be verified?
- How will duplicate, inactive or fictitious memberships be removed?
- How will membership registers be continuously updated?
- How will voting credentials be issued?
- How will electronic or physical voting be secured?
- How will disputes over membership and eligibility be resolved?
- What role will the Electoral Commission play in supervising the process?
The quality of the eventual reform will depend heavily on how seriously these questions are addressed.
THE REAL TEST: IMPLEMENTATION
The constitutional principle may be simple; implementation will not be.
Moving from relatively small delegate colleges to a substantially larger electorate will place enormous demands on party administration.
Political parties will need reliable membership databases, credible identification mechanisms, transparent electoral procedures, secure voting infrastructure and effective dispute-resolution systems.
The transition will also expose another reality: DEMOCRACY HAS AN ADMINISTRATIVE COST. A broader electorate requires broader infrastructure.
The parties that adapt successfully will not merely amend their constitutions. They will have to redesign how they understand membership itself.
A party member can no longer be treated simply as a supporter who attends rallies, pays dues or campaigns during elections.
Membership becomes a constitutional political status carrying a direct role in determining who may seek public office under the party’s banner.
A NEW POLITICAL ERA?
The deeper significance of the judgment may therefore lie beyond the immediate dispute between particular plaintiffs and a particular political party.
If the Court’s interpretation is implemented as anticipated, Ghana could be moving from a delegate-mediated model of internal party democracy toward a direct membership franchise.
That would represent one of the most consequential changes to Ghanaian party politics since the beginning of the Fourth Republic.
But constitutional declarations do not transform institutions by themselves.
The next twelve months will determine whether political parties can convert a judicial principle into functioning democratic machinery.
By July 2027, Ghana may have a fundamentally different answer to the question of who chooses political candidates.
The old answer was: the delegates.
The emerging constitutional answer is: the members.
And the countdown has already begun.
Thank you for reading.
